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In the two experiments reported here, we tested the retrieval-plus-scan model of delayed probe
recognition by adding a second probe 2 sec after subjects had responded to the first probe. Accord-
ing to this model, the list items should still be in consciousness from the first probe at the time
of the second probe. Consequently, on tests in which the first probe had been tested immediately,
we expected to find the same pattern of performance on both first and second probes. On tests
in which the first probe came after a filled delay, we expected the first-probe data to show the
effects of retrieval and proactive interference. These effects should not be present on the second
probe. The results of the first-probe data in both experiments were consistent with the retrieval-
plus-scan model. The second-probe data did not fit the model, however. In the first experiment,
the second probe on what had been delayed first-probe trials still produced intercept differences,
indicating the presence of retrieval. In the second experiment, the effects of proactive interference
were still present on the second probe. It is suggested that these results not only invalidate the
retrieval-plus-scan model for delayed probe recognition but that they, along with other results,
cast doubt on a scanning operation in immediate probe recognition.
Recall at short intervals seems to be qualitatively differ-
ent from recall at longer retention intervals (Craik &
Levy, 1976). The initial explanations for this difference
proposed that different memory structures underlay per-
formance at these different retention intervals. Primary
memory (PM) in the form of a short-term store was seen
to underlie performance on short-term memory tasks, and
secondary memory (SM) in the form of a long-term store
was seen to be responsible for performance on long-term
memory tasks. The evidence for this distinction was ini-
tially quite strong, but over the years support for several
of the central tenets of these theories was shown to be
lacking, with the result that the evidential basis for mak-
ing the distinction between PM and SM has been slowly
eroding (Crowder, 1982).
Recently, however, the work of Wickens and his as-
sociates (Wickens, Moody, & Dow, 1981; Wickens,
Moody, & Vidulich, 1985) has suggested a methodology
that appears to operationalize the distinction between PM
and SM. Their model of PM is one of a number that
equates the contents of PM with what is in consciousness
(Craik & Jacoby, 1975; James, 1890). Their operation-
alization of PM and SM is based upon differential per-
formance on immediate and delayed trials of the Sternberg
recognition paradigm. In Wickens et al. ’s version of this
task, subjects are shown a small number of items (either
two or four items in the memory set) and then are asked
to recognize a probe after either a brief (2-sec), unfilled
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retention interval (immediate test) or a 12-sec interval
(delayed test) filled with some form of distracting activity
such as counting backward in threes from a random three-
digit number. The effects of proactive interference (PI)
also are incorporated into the task by observing recogni-
tion performance over a number of trials using materials
from the same taxonomic category. Specifically, instances
from the same category are used over three trials, another
set of materials is used for the next three trials, and so
on. This procedure sets up a continuous release from a
PI situation in that on the first trial of any given set of
materials, PI will be at a minimum. PI then builds up over
the next trials so that it is at a maximum by the third trial.
In all of their experiments using this methodology, ef-
fects of memory-set size were found. It took subjects
longer to recognize a positive probe, or to reject a nega-
tive probe, if there were four items in the memory set
than if there were only two. Moreover, in all of their con-
ditions, the scanning rates (i.e., the differences in reac-
tion time between the 2- and 4-item memory sets) were
equivalent. The only differences lay in the intercept values
for each condition.
These intercept differences are important for the present
paper. On immediate trials, Wickens et al. (1981) ob-
served no difference in latency between low- and high-
interference trials. However, an intercept difference
emerged when the tests were delayed. Subjects responded
to delayed low-interference trials 95 msec slower than
they responded to immediate trials. In addition, the ef-
fects of PI emerged: latencies for high-interference de-
layed trials were reliably slower (about 40 msec) than
latencies for low-interference delayed trials.
Wickens et al. ’s explanation for this pattern of results
is that items are in consciousness on immediate trials. When
the probe item is presented, it is matched with each item
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in consciousness in a serial exhaustive search (Sternberg,
1969), and since it takes longer to search large sets than
small sets, latencies differ for different set sizes. In addi-
tion, since the items are already in consciousness, they
do not have to be retrieved. As consequence, immediate
trials are free from the effects of PI, since the locus of
PI effects is generally accepted to be at the retrieval stage
of processing (Watkins & Watkins, 1975). It is on the
basis of the lack of retrieval and PI effects that Wickens
et al. concluded that immediate trials are an operation-
alization of PM.
Wickens et al.’s explanation of equal scanning rates but
different intercepts for the high and low PI conditions was
that either the list as a whole or a pointer to the list was
retrieved from SM and made active in PM. This retrieval
took time and was subject to the effects of PI. Once the
list had been retrieved (brought back into consciousness),
however, it was searched in the same way as on immedi-
ate trials.
Halford, Maybery, and Bain (1988) have provided ad-
ditional evidence that seems consistent with some aspects
of Wickens et al. ’s analysis. On the basis of the general
assumption in the literature that PM is of limited capacity,
Halford et al. argued that if one increases the set size be-
yond the capacity of PM, some of the items will have to
be retrieved from SM. Thus, even on an immediate test,
the effects of retrieval and PI should become evident on
large set sizes. Using set sizes of 4, 6, 8, and 10 items,
they replicated Wickens et al. ’s finding of no PI effects
for a set size of four, but they did find PI effects for all
the other set sizes used. Halford et al. then tested the
hypothesis that PM capacity increases with age by test-
ing a group of 8- and 9-year-olds. They found that no PI
was observed with a set size of two but that PI was present
with a set size of four. These results are compatible with
the notion that items from SM have to be retrieved (but
see Halford et al. for some alternative explanations).
The experiments described in this paper were designed
to test a particular aspect of the Wickens et al. model,
though they may have implications for the remaining
aspects of the model as well. As mentioned earlier, per-
formance on a delayed task has been explained in terms
of the list being retrieved, with the retrieval being sub-
ject to PI. Once the list has been retrieved (brought back
into consciousness), the list is scanned in an identical
fashion as in the PM case. The question we posed is, what
would happen if a second probe was presented shortly
after the subject had made his or her decision about the
first probe? On the basis of the Wickens et al. model, we
expected no retrieval or PI effects with the second probes.
On an immediate test, the list items are assumed to be
in consciousness prior to the presentation of the first
probe. The serial scan, in which the probe is compared
to each item in the list, presumably serves to maintain
the list items in PM (i.e., it serves as a rehearsal task).
Thus, when the second probe is presented, the list items
should still be in PM and the reaction time to the second
probe should be independent of the level of PI. With a
delayed test, the initial situation is different but the second-
probe results should be similar to the results found on an
immediate test. Prior to the first probe, the items are pre-
sumed to be in SM. When the probe is presented, the list
is assumed to be retrieved. Following this retrieval, the
list items are assumed to be scanned just as if they had
always been in PM. Now when a second probe is pre-
sented, there is presumably no need to retrieve the list
items. The second scan on this list should be identical to
the second scan on an immediate test. Thus, on delayed
tests, we would expect to see the effects of retrieval and
PI on the first probe, but no retrieval and PI effects on
the second probe. The two experiments which follow were
set out to examine this prediction.
In the first experiment, we examined what Wickens
et al. call uncomplicated retrieval. We examined laten-
cies for first and second probes on immediate and delayed
tests, in which the items studied were uncategorized and
were used only once in the experiment (except when the
item was a positive probe). We predicted that for the first
probe, we would replicate Wickens et al.’s finding of iden-
tical scanning rates but different intercepts for the immedi-
ate and delayed conditions. For the second probe, we
expected to find no difference in either scanning rates
or intercepts between immediate and delayed trials since
it was argued that in both cases the items were already
in PM.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Subjects
Forty, first-year psychology students from the University of
Queensland served as subjects in the experiment. The subjects were
tested individually and all received course credit for their partici-
pation. The data of I of the subjects were eliminated from all anal-
yses because a computer error resulted in only a small portion of
the data being recorded.
Materials and Apparatus
The experimental setting was a sound-attenuated room. All stimuli
were controlled and subject performance was recorded by an
Amiga 1000 computer. The word stimuli for the practice trials, the
input trials, and the word-recognition probes consisted of 344 high-
frequency, high-concrete, and high-imagery nouns selected from
either the Toronto Word Pool (Friendly, Franklin, Hoffman, &
Rubin, 1982) or the Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968) norms.
The "mouse" buttons on the Amiga served as response switches,
one button being marked "yes," the other "’no." No attempt was
made to control the way in which subje~s used the mouse to respond.
Procedure and Design
The task was similar to that employed by Wickens et al. (1981),
with the exception that a second probe was presented after the first.
Basically, the subjects performed two versions of the varied-set
Sternberg (1969) paradigm, the versions differing only in the reten-
tion interval involved: a 2-sec unfilled interval in what Wickens
et al. have termed the PM case, and a 12-sec filled-retention inter-
val in the SM case. Each trial started with a brief "ready" signal,
followed by a memory set of either two or four words which was
presented simultaneously for 3 sec on the screen in a vertical array.
The subjects were instructed to read the words aloud. On PM trials,
after a 2-sec unfilled retention interval following the presentation
of the material, a probe item appeared for 2 sec. The subject’s task
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was to decide whether or not the probe ~tem was a member of the
memory set and then to respond as qmckly as possible by pressing
one of the buttons on the mouse. After the response to the first probe,
the screen went blank for 2 sec and then a second probe appeared
for 2 sec. Again, the subject had to decide ifth~s second probe was
also a member of the memory set. In the SM trials, a random three-
digit number appeared on the screen for 12 sec. The subjects were
requested to say the number aloud and then to count backward in
threes from that number. After 12 sec ofcountang, the screen cleared
for 2 sec and then the first probe appeared for 2 sec. After the sub-
jects had responded to the first probe, the screen cleared for 2 sec
more and then the second probe appeared for 2 sec. The subjects
then responded to this second probe. A 4-sec intertrial interval sepa-
rated all trials. The 2-sec unfilled interval prior to the first probe
was included both because W~ckens et al. (1981) had used it and
because we wanted to provide the same amount of preparation time
prior to the first and second probes. As we shall see later, how-
ever, this may not have been successful.
The experiment consisted of 92 trials, which were presented in
three blocks. The first block was a set of 16 practice trials followed
by two experimental blocks of 38 trials, the first two trials of each
experimental block also being practice trials. Each block was sepa-
rated by a 3-rain rest break. Of the 72 trials for which data were
recorded, half the trials were immediate (PM) trials and half were
delayed (SM) trials. Within these groups, half the trials consisted
of two-item memory sets and half had four-item memory sets,
Each trial involved a subject making two recognition responses,
one to the first probe and one to the second probe. There were four
combinations of probes used in the experiment. These were Old
Old (OO), Old New (ON), New Old (NO), and New New (NN),
the first of each combination describing the first probe, the second
referring to the second probe. "Old" represents a positive probe,
that is, a word that was present in the memory set, requnang a "yes"
response from the subjects. "New" words were words that had
not been studied in the memory set, and thus required a "no"
response from the subjects.
For the practice trials, all four probe combinations were equally
distributed. This was not so for the experimental trials, since our
primary interest was with recognition of Old words. Therefore, of
the 72 experimental trials, 32 had the probe combination of OO,
16 of ON, 16 of NO, and 8 of NN; half of these trials appeared
in the first block and half in the second. The choice of Old probes
was randomly selected without replacement on each trial.
The assignment of items to trials was randomized for each sub-
ject, as was the order of trials within each block, with the constraint
that not more than four repetitions of the same probe condition or
three of the same-size memory set could occur. None of the word
stimuli were ever seen more than once by any subject, except in
the case of a positive probe.
Results
Two measures were used in the subsequent analyses:
the median RTs of correct responses to the different types
of probes, and the accuracy of the subjects’ responses to
the different types of probes. In all analyses, the data were
submitted to 2 ×2 repeated-measures ANOVAs, with
retention interval and memory-set size being the two fac-
. tors. An alpha level of .05 was used to determine statisti-
cal reliability.
First-Probe Analyses
Although performance on the first probe trials was not
the principle focus of this experiment, analysis of the first-
probe data should replicate Wickens et al. ’s (1981) data.
Since the subjects could not distinguish, at the time of
responding, between the two conditions that had positive
probes as the first probe (OO, ON), the data have been
collapsed across these two sets of trials. Likewise, the data
for the two conditions that had negative probes as the first
probe (NO, NN) were collapsed. The means of median
latency for the positive and negative first probes on error-
free trials are presented in Figure 1.
Positive probes. The analysis of positive-probe latency
revealed reliable effects for retention interval [F(1,38) =
4.17, MSe = 16,028] and set size [F(1,39) = 10.41, MSe =
7,515] (see Figure 1). The interaction between retention
interval and set size was not significant.
The subjects correctly identified positive probes more
often on the immediate test than on the delayed test
[F(1,38) = 20.77, MSe = 0.004], but this was qualified
by an interaction with set size [F(1,39) = 12.47, MSe =
0.004]. Performance was very accurate on immediate tests
(98% and 99% accuracy for set sizes of two and four
words, respectively); however, although performance was
still accurate on a delayed test using a set size of two (97%
accuracy), errors increased when a set size of four was
probed after a delay (82% accuracy).
Negative probes. Analysis of negative-probe latency
revealed no reliable results for retention interval, set size,
or the interaction of retention interval with set size. The
differences between means, although in the right direc-
tion, were not as pronounced as with the positive probes.
In addition, performance on the negative probes seemed
to be more variable than performance on the positive
probes.
The accuracy data also appear to be equivalent across
the various conditions (97% accuracy on immediate tests
and 98% accuracy on delayed tests). There were no reli-
able main effects, nor a reliable interaction.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the latency data for the posi-
tive probes conform to the predictions of Wickens et al.
(1981). On the immediate test, we found the traditional
set-size effect associated with the Sternberg paradigm. We
replicated the Wickens et al. data on the delayed test in
that we obtained a difference in intercept but not in slope
between the immediate test and the delayed test.
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Figure 1. First-probe data for Experiment 1. Reaction time as a
function of memory-set size, retention interval, and nature of
the probe.
RETRIEVAL PLUS SCAN 715
700 .
600 "
500
400
Second Probe-O0
2 4
SET SIZE
Second Probe-NO
700 -
600 ¯
500 ¯
400 ¯
2 4
SET SIZE
Figure 2. Second-probe data for the OO probe combination (top)
and the NO probe combination (bottom) in Experiment 1. Reaction
time as a function of memory-set size, retention interval, and na-
ture of the probe.
Second-Probe Analyses
Positive probes. The means of median latency for the
second probe (positive probes only) on error-free trials
are presented in Figure 2. The data are presented sep-
arately for Probe Combinations OO and NO because of
the obvious differences between these two conditions.
That is, with Probe Combination OO, there was a differ-
ence between the immediate and delayed conditions with
a set size of four but not with a set size of two. With Probe
Combination NO, however, there was a difference between
the immediate and delayed conditions with both set sizes.
The planned analysis was collapsed over Probe Com-
binations OO and NO. Reliable effects were found for
set size [F(1,38) = 57.68, MSe = 7,097] and retention in-
terval [F(1,38) = 18.98, MSe = 6,097]. In addition, the
interaction between set size and retention interval was sig-
nificant [F(1,38) = 8.33, MSe = 7,491]. The accuracy
data mirrored the latency data with main effects for set
size and retention interval [F(1,38) = 29.56, MS, =
0.003, and F(1,38) = 34.97, MSe = 0.004, respectively].
The interaction between set size and retention interval was
also significant [F(1,38) = 17.84, MSe = 0.003]. Per-
formance was at the 98% level on immediate tests; on
delayed tests, however, although accuracy was still good
with set sizes of two (97%), with set sizes of four, ac-
curacy fell to the 88% level.
Negative probes. The pattern of RT performance on
the negative second probes (Probe Combinations ON and
NN were combined and latencies were calculated as for
the positive probes) was similar to that of the positive
probes. The main effects of retention interval [F(1,38) =
6.87, MSe = 3,346] and set size [F(1,38) = 24.65, MSe =
4,871] were reliable, as was the interaction between reten-
tion interval and set size [F(1,38) = 4.19, MSe = 4,156].
The median latencies were 770 and 796 msec for the im-
mediate tests with set sizes of two and four, respectively;
they were 808 and 812 msec for the delayed tests with
set sizes of two and four, respectively. As was the case
with the negative first probes, accuracy on the negative
second probes was equivalent for all conditions at the
98% level.
These results provide only partial support for the no-
tion that the list items were in PM for the second probe.
The data for the two-word set size are consistent with the
theory, but the data for the four-word set size are not.
To examine these effects further, we looked, on a post hoc
basis, at the two positive second probes (OO and NO) in-
dividually to see if the same pattern of performance held
for both.
For the OO trials, the effects of retention interval and
set size were reliable [F(1,38) = 18.17, MSe = 6,742,
and F(1,38) = 106.48, MSe = 7037, respectively]. In
addition, the interaction between retention interval and
set size was significant [F(1,38) = 14.67, MS~ = 8,244].
As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 2, there was
no difference on the second probe between the immedi-
ate and the delayed test when a set size of two was being
used. This is the pattern of results one would expect if
the set was in consciousness after the first probe had been
processed and was scanned a second time. However, when
the set size was four, there was a reliable difference be-
tween the immediate and the delayed test. This result is
at odds with the notion that the list is in consciousness
the second time it is probed.
Analysis of the NO probes produced only one reliable
effect--that of retention interval [F(1,38) = 5.83, MSe =
17,733]. The data are presented in the bottom panel of
Figure 2. Although the means are based on only half the
number of observations as for the OO combination, and
are thus not as reliable as one would like, it would seem
that the effects of retention interval have been replicated
at the four-word set size, but that at the two-word set size,
the second probe on the delayed test produced longer
latencies than did the corresponding probe on the immedi-
ate test. Thus, we seem to have failed to replicate the two-
word set-size effect found with the OO combination.
One aspect of the data that came as somewhat of a sur-
prise was the general decrease in latency on the second
probe. We had expected that all second-probe responses
would be as fast as the responses to the first probe. To
check the reliability of this observation, the four-word set-
size data were subjected to a 2 ×2 ×2 repeated-measures
ANOVA, with probe number, test delay, and whether the
probe was old or new being the factors. The reason that
only four-word set-size data were used was that we be-
lieve that on trials with a set size of two, the subjects may
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have used a recall strategy. Our reasons for this conclu-
sion are presented more fully in the discussion.
Responses to the second probes were reliably faster than
responses to first probes [F(1,38) = 53.61, MSe = 27,716],
longer latencies were found on delayed tests than on im-
mediate tests [F(1,38) = 8.38, MS = 21,020], and the
subjects responded more quickly to old probes than to new
probes [F(1,38) = 39.26, MSe = 10,193]. There was
also a significant interaction between probe number and
probe delay [F(1,38) = 5.49, MS = 7,151]. The differ-
ence in latency between the first and second probes was
more pronounced on the immediate test (160 msec) than
on the delayed test (116 msec).
Discussion
The first-probe data are consistent with the Wickens
et al. model. Latencies were faster with a set size of two
than with a set size of four. When the test was delayed,
we found equivalent scanning rates in the immediate test
condition, but we found a difference in intercept. Wickens
et al. interpreted this pattern in terms of a serial exhaus-
tive scan of the contents of PM in each case, the only
difference being that in the delayed test, the items have
to be retrieved from SM and made active in PM. The ftrst-
probe data therefore provide us with a benchmark that
suggests that our subjects were doing much the same as
Wickens et al.’s subjects.
The second-probe data are neither wholly consistent nor
inconsistent with the Wickens et al. model. For the OO
combination, the effects at the two-word set size are con-
sistent with the view that the items are in PM on the sec-
ond probe, in that the latency for the second probe on the
delayed test was the same as the latency on the second
probe on the immediate test. However, the pattern changes
on the four-word set-size trials. Assuming that the items
are in PM on the second probe, one would expect to find
that latencies would be equivalent on the immediate and
delayed tests, just as they were in the two-word set-size
case. Clearly, those expectations have not been realized;
latencies on the delayed trials were substantially longer
than those on the immediate trials.
There are a number of possible explanations for this
pattern of results. On the basis of the Halford et al.’s
(1988) research, it is possible that, for our subjects, the
capacity of PM is close enough to four items, so that with
a four-item but not a two-item memory set, responding
to the probe knocks one or more items out of PM. If this
were to happen, a second retrieval would need to be car-
ried out when the second probe of a four-item memory
set was presented.
Our preferred explanation, however, is that the equiva-
lent latencies for the two-word set size on the immediate
and delayed tests reflect the use of a recall strategy. We
think that after responding to the first probe, the other
member of the set is not in consciousness but is brought
back into consciousness by a deliberate recall strategy.
The probe is then directly matched to the second item.
This explanation seems reasonable given that on the NO
combinations, in which this strategy cannot be used, there
was a significant effect of delay on second-probe reac-
tion time for both the two-item and the four-item memory
sets. Our data would suggest that the use of this strategy
is limited only to the case in which two items are in the
memory set, so that after an old probe, only a single item
has to be brought back into consciousness as opposed to
the multiple items in Wickens et al.’s proposal.
The difference in RT between the first and second
probes is also problematic for the notion that the second-
probe items are in PM. One possible explanation for the
quicker reaction time to the second probe could be that,
on some occasions, the list is in consciousness when the
second probe is presented even though it had not been
when the first probe had been presented. If this were the
case, one would expect that the difference between the
first and second probes would be greater on delayed tests
than on immediate tests. However, the obtained data are
the opposite to this prediction. The second-probe advan-
tage was more pronounced on the immediate test than on
the delayed test.
Whatever the explanation for the results, clearly there
is only mixed support for the Wickens et al. model. We
decided to test the model further by examining the effects
of PI on the second probe.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, we looked at PI effects on the first
and second probe, using delayed tests only. Again, we
expected to replicate Wickens et al. ’s (1981) data on the
first probe by finding equivalent scanning rates in all con-
ditions as well as intercept differences between the high-
and low-interference trials. In addition, we predicted that
intercept differences would disappear on the second probe
if the list items are brought back into consciousness when
the first probe is presented.
The procedure used in this experiment was conceptu-
ally the same as that used by Wickens et al. (1981), how-
ever some differences were introduced. Wickens et al.
varied the number of items in the three trials per taxo-
nomic category by using two formats: the first and third
trials with set sizes of two and the second trial with a set
size of four, or the reverse (i.e., using the first and third
trials with set sizes of four and the second trial with a
set size of two). In Experiment 2, we changed the Wickens
et al. procedure by presenting all three trials per category
with the same memory-set size. The Wickens et al. for-
mat was adapted to control the amount of PI on the third
trial. That is, irrespective of the set size on the high-
interference trial, six instances from the category had been
seen prior to it. Whether or not this is the proper way
to control for the amount of PI is problematic. We think
that PI could be a function of the number of prior items,
the number of prior lists, or an average of the number
of prior items weighted by how recently the interfering
material had been presented (see Humphreys & Tehan,
1988). Because we did not believe that the Wickens et al.
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procedure necessarily controlled for the amount of PI, and
because we were primarily concerned with whether the
pattern of results was the same for both the first and the
second probes, we decided to present all three trials per
category with the same set size. This procedure may not
equalize PI effects, but it does have a major advantage
in that the data from the second trial in each group can
now be incorporated into the analyses.
Method
Subjects
Two different cohorts of 20 psychology students each participated
in this experiment. The first cohort were introductory psychology
students who participated for course credit. The second cohort were
third-year undergraduate psychology students who participated in
the experiment as a class assignment. All 40 subjects were tested
individually in a session that lasted approximately 1 h.
Materials
The stimulus pool used in this experiment was derived by sam-
pling 18 instances from each of 36 different taxonomic categories.
These categories and their respective instances were selected from
Casey and Heath’s (1988) Australian category norms, Nelson and
McEvoy’s (1982) norms, or Shapiro and Palermo’s (1970) norms.
In selecting the categories, care was taken to minimize between-
category similarity.
The 18 instances from each category formed the basis of three
trials. Of the six words randomly assigned to each trial, four were
randomly assigned to be memory-set items (two of these were ran-
domly selected on two-word set-size trials) and two were selected
to be negative probes. Thus, in all, there were 108 experimental
trials, comprising three consecutive trials from each category. The
first trial in each set of three using the same category represented
the low-interference condition. The second trial theoretically should
increase the amount of interference, while the third trial in each
set represented the high-interference condition.
The 108 trials were presented in blocks of 54 trials. One block
of 54 trials involved memory-set sizes of two; the other experimental
block consisted of 54 trials each with a memory set of four items.
Thus, memory-set size was blocked rather than randomized as it
had been in the first experiment. The first cohort of subjects received
the two-word set-size trials first, followed by the four-word set-
size trials. The second cohort of subjects received the four-word
set-size trials first and the two-word set-size trials second.
Again, the same probe combinations used in the first experiment
(Old-Old, Old-New, New-Old, New-New) were used here. Old
probes were ones that were studied as part of the memory set. New
words were words from the same category as those in the memory
set, but had not been studied on the current or any previous trial.
For the 18 low-interference trials in each block, 8 trials had the
OO combination, 4 trials had the ON combination, 4 trials had the
NO combination, and 2 trials had the NN combination. The same
ratio of probe combinations was used in the second and third (or
high-interference) trials using the same category. The actual probe
combinations across the three trials using the same category were
randomized. As in Experiment 1, positive probes were randomly
sampled without replacement from the memory set.
Prior to the experimental blocks being presented, the subjects
studied eight practice lists of unrelated words. Half the practice trials
used memory sets of two and half used set sizes of four. In addi-
tion, each cue combination was used once for each set size.
Procedure
The procedure used in this experiment was almost identical to
the delayed condition used in the last experiment. After a brief
"ready" signal, the subjects were presented with either two or four
items to study. The first set of subjects read these words aloud;
however, due to an oversight, the second cohort did not read the
words aloud but studied them silently. Then a random three-dlg~t
number was displayed and the subjects counted backward in threes
from this number for 12 sec. Then the screen went blank for 2 sec,
after which the first probe was presented. After the subject responded
to the first probe, the screen went blank for a further 2 sec,
which was followed immediately by the second probe. After
the subject responded to the second probe, an intertrial interval of
4 sec ensued.
Results
Because there were some procedural differences be-
tween cohorts, initial analyses were done in which co-
hort was a factor. The results of these analyses showed
that the first cohort was reliably faster than the second
on all probe combinations. We are not sure whether this
difference is due to the second cohort’s taking more care
before making a decision, or to the fact that the first cohort
read the items out loud whereas the second cohort read
them silently. In addition, on the first probes, the set-size
effect was much stronger for the second than for the first
cohort. By definition, these set-size effects lead to changes
in the slope of the scanning function. This difference in
set-size effects appears to be due to asymmetrical prac-
tice effects associated with the different orders in which
the conditions were presented. The first cohort was tested
on the four-item trials after having practiced the proce-
dure on 54, two-item trials. In contrast, the second co-
hort started the session with the four-item trials and was
thus without the benefit of practice on the two-item trials.
We believe that differential set-size effects reflect the
differential practice each cohort received on the four-item
trials. In any case, the critical feature of the data is that
set-size effects were found in both cohorts. In addition,
interference effects were essentially the same in both
groups. To view the results without these practice effects,
the data from both groups were collapsed and then ana-
lyzed. Again, median RTs were calculated only on trials
in which the subjects had made the correct response. All
analyses were 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVAs, with set
size and interference condition as the factors.
First-Probe Analyses
Positive probes. An inspection of the results showed
that the pattern of results found on the first probe approx-
imams Wickens et al.’s (1981) data. Latencies for set sizes
of two were faster than latencies for set sizes of four. The
scanning rates across the three trials were roughly equiva-
lent, and intercept differences emerged as PI built up. The
only surprising finding was that there was almost as much
PI on the second trial as there was on the third. Since this
finding was common to all analyses, the data from Trials 2
and 3 have been collapsed in the figures.
Analysis of the latencies to correct responses to old first
probes (OO and ON) revealed reliable effects for set size
[F(1,39) = 38.21, MSe = 45,248] and interference con-
dition [F(2,78) = 4.72, MSe = 9,468]. The interaction
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between memory-set size and interference condition was
not reliable.
Negative probes. The latencies from 1 subject were
eliminated from the negative first probes (NO and NN)
because that subject provided fewer than two correct
responses for one condition. The latency data for the other
39 subjects were analyzed. The only reliable effect was
that of set size [F(1,38) = 34.04, MSe = 45,498]. The
apparent absence of an interference effect is problematic
in that we did not replicate Wickens et al. ’s (1981) find-
ings. As is evident in Figure 3, the pattern of results seems
to be similar for positive and negative probes, but the ef-
fects appear to be stronger for the positive probes.
The accuracy data for both positive and negative probes
produced only one reliable effect--that of memory-set size
[F(1,39) = 19.04, MSe = 1.508, and F(1,39) = 9.02,
MS¢ = 0.312, for positive and negative probes, respec-
tively]. On the positive trials, the subjects were 94% ac-
curate on trials with a set size of two and 89% accurate
on trials with a set size of four. For negative probes, ac-
curacy was 96% and 92% for set sizes of two and four,
respectively. It would seem that speed-accuracy tradeoffs
are not present, in that the subjects were slower to respond
and made more errors with the larger set size than they
did with the smaller one.
Second-Probe Analyses
Positive probes. The second probes of the OO and NO
combinations were analyzed separately, in accord with Ex-
periment 1. For the OO combination, the effect of memory-
set size was reliable [F(1,39) = 210.27, MSe = 13,732],
as was the effect of interference condition [F(2,78) =
5.05, MS¢ = 8,491]. The interaction between memory-
set size and interference condition was not significant.
Although latencies to the second probe were consider-
ably faster than latencies to the first probe, the overall
pattern of performance was quite similar to the first-probe
results, as can be seen in the top panel of Figure 4.
Responses were faster when the set size was two rather
than four, and the scanning rate was roughly equivalent
in both conditions. The different intercepts indicate that
PI had an effect on performance. The point is that we did
not replicate the two-word set-size effects found in
Experiment 1.
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Figure 3. First-probe data for Experiment 2. Reaction time as a
function of memory-set size, interference level, and nature of
the probe.
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Figure 4. Second-probe data for the OO probe combination (top),
the NO probe combination (middle), and the combined ONfNN probe
combinations (bottom) in Experiment 2. Reaction time as a func-
tion of memory-set size, interference level, and nature of the probe.
In the analysis of the NO condition, 3 subjects’ data
were eliminated because they produced fewer than two
correct responses in at least one of the conditions. Anal-
ysis of the latency data of the remaining 37 subjects re-
vealed reliable effects of set size and interference
[F(1,36) = 19.60, MSe = 56,528, and F(2,72) = 6.48,
MS¢ = 43,166, respectively]. The interaction was not
significant.
The middle panel of Figure 4 again shows that the basic
pattern of results was maintained with the NO combina-
tion. Set-size effects are present, scanning rates are within
tolerable limits, and PI effects are present.
Negative probes. As with the first probes, the data from
the second probes from the ON and NN combinations
were collapsed to get a reasonably reliable measure of
performance. Again, the data from 1 subject had to be
eliminated. Reliable effects for set size and interference
condition were found [F(1,38) = 81.08, MS~ = 14,168,
and F(2,76) = 8.29, MSe = 5,100, respectively]. As
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with the negative first probes, the effects of set size were
present with the second probe. However, unlike the nega-
tive first probe, the effects of interference were readily
apparent on the second negative probe, as can be seen
in the bottom panel of Figure 4.
The accuracy data for the second probes in the OO, NO,
and combined ON/NN probe combinations were ana-
lyzed. On OO trials, the subjects were 96% accurate on
trials with a set size of two and 87% accurate on trials
with a set size of four. For NO trials, accuracy was 94%
and 88% for set sizes of two and four, respectively. Like-
wise, on negative trials, accuracy was 97% and 94%
for set sizes of two and four, respectively. In all cases,
the only reliable effect obtained was that of set size
[F(1,39) = 19.82, MSe = 1.43, F(1,39) = 8.82, MSe =
.425, and F(1,39) = 6.39, MSe = 0.319, for OO, NO,
and negative probes, respectively]. Again, speed-accuracy
tradeoffs do not seem to be evident.
The subjects responded to the second probes more
quickly than they did to the first probes. For the two-word
set-size trials, the difference between first- and second-
probe RTs was 173 msec on the first trial in blocks in
which an old probe was being tested. The difference was
185 msec on the second trial and 181 msec on the third
trial. On trials in which a new probe was presented, the
second-probe advantage was 157 msec on the first trial
in a block of three, 147 msec on the second trial, and
130 msec on the third trial. For the four-word set-size data
in which an old probe had been presented, the second-probe
advantage was 181 msec on the first trial, 187 msec on
the second trial, and 198 msec on the third trial. For four-
word set-size trials in which a new probe was presented,
the difference was 190 msec on the first trial, 183 msec
on the second trial, and 180 msec on the third trial.
To establish the reliability of the second-probe advan-
tage, 2 × 3 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs, with probe
number, trial number, and probe type being the factors,
were carried out on the two-word and four-word set-size
data. For both set sizes, the second probe produced reli-
ably faster latencies [F(1,39) = 70.70, MSe = 44,574 for
two-word set size, F(1,39) = 35.19, MSe = 115,689 for
four-word set size]. Again, the effects of PI were found
for both set sizes [F(1,39) = 9.53, MS, = 5,650 for the
two-word set size, F(1,39) = 4.82, MSe = 14,189 for
the four-word set size]. Likewise, the subjects responded
to old probes more quickly than they did to new probes
[F(1,39) = 79.24, MS~ = 13,175 for the two-word set
size, F(1,39) = 22.32, MSe = 27,326 for the four-word
set size].
Discussion
As with Experiment 1, the first-probe data replicate
Wickens et al.’s (1981) data and are thus consistent with
their model. Set-size effects were strong and the effects
of PI were present and seem robust enough for us to con-
clude that the changes in procedure used had little effect
upon performance. One somewhat surprising result found
with our procedure, which was not testable using the
Wickens et al. procedure, is that PI was as strong on the
second trial of each set as on the third. It would seem that
PI builds up very rapidly (Humphreys & Tehan, 1988).
In Experiment 2, unlike Experiment 1, there was no
support for the idea that list items remained active in PM
prior to the second probe. For both the OO and the NO
combinations, PI effects were present for both set sizes,
suggesting that some sort of retrieval was taking place
after the presentation of the second probe.
In Experiment 1, retrieval effects had not been present
for the second probe in set sizes of two, but this was due
predominantly to the OO combination. For this reason,
we argued that, with set sizes of two, the subjects may
have been using the strategy of recalling the item that had
not been probed the first time around and then doing a
direct match with the second probe when it was presented.
It seemed plausible that the same strategy could be used
in the current experiment and, if it were used, one could
reasonably expect to see little effect of PI for set sizes
of two items in the OO combination. In Experiment 2,
however, the amount of PI on set sizes of two was ap-
proximately the same for the OO and NO combinations.
It is possible that the subjects in Experiment 2 did not use
the strategy or did not use it as often (the use of such a
strategy in Experiment 1 may have been stimulated by
the immediate tests on the two-word set size), or, alter-
natively, the finding in Experiment 1 may not be reliable.
In any event, there is clearly no evidence for the hypothe-
sis that retaining four items in PM while responding to
the first probe strains the capacity of PM whereas retain-
ing two items and responding does not. If this were oc-
curring, we should not have found PI on the second probe
for set sizes of two in Experiment 2.
As in Experiment 1, the subjects responded to second
probes much more quickly than they had to first probes.
The second-probe advantage seems to be fairly standard
in this experiment and does not seem to be influenced
in any way by the buildup of PI. At this time, our
preferred explanation for the second-probe advantage is
a general preparation to respond. During the 2-sec un-
filled retention interval on the immediate tests in Experi-
ment 1, the subjects were actively engaged in learning the
list (rehearsing it or organizing it). Thus, they may have
had insufficient time to prepare to encode and respond
to the probe, or their ability to predict exactly when the
probe would occur may have been impaired. On the
delayed tests, there was also a 2-sec delay which was os-
tensibly unfdled. However, this interval was at least par-
tially filled by the conclusion of the counting activity. In
contrast, the 2-sec interval prior to the second probe
started with the conclusion of the subject’s response (the
button press). Thus, there may have been more time to
prepare or a greater certainty about the time at which the
second probe would be presented than there was with the
first probe. The increased preparation would account for
both the faster responses and the fact that the results were
somewhat more consistent with the second probe than they
were with the first probe (the greater consistency being
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due to a reduction in the variance). This explanation is
supported by the failure to find any variable that in-
fluenced the magnitude of the second-probe advantage in
Experiment 2.
It is, of course, possible that a portion of the second-
probe advantage could reflect memory processes in ad-
dition to an enhanced preparation to encode and respond.
To establish this would, however, require a control con-
dition in which the first probe probes some other memory
set (e.g., a fixed, long-term memory set). Support for a
memorial explanation would be obtained if the response
to the second probe was faster when the first probe probed
the same memory set than when it probed a different
memory set. Such a finding would have important impli-
cations for our understanding of probe recognition. The
important point with respect to this paper, however, is
that the second-probe advantage is not due to an enhanced
presence in primary memory. If this were the case, the
second-probe advantage in Experiment 1 should have been
greater for the delayed condition than for the immediate
condition. Instead, it was significant in the opposite
direction.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The first-probe data in both experiments are consistent
with an explanation in terms of retrieving a list from SM
and making it active in PM, followed by an exhaustive
serial search through that list (Wickens et al., 1981,
1985). However, the second-probe results in both experi-
ments are contrary to what one would predict assuming
a reasonable extension of the Wickens et al. model. In
Experiment 1, latencies were generally longer on the sec-
ond probe in delayed trials than in immediate trials, thus
indicating some act of retrieval from SM. In addition, in
Experiment 2, in which only delayed tests were used but
PI varied, reliable effects of PI were found in all second-
probe conditions. Overall, the data suggest that if a vari-
able affects the first probe (immediate vs. delay, low PI
vs. high PI), it affects the second probe as well. This
seems to be incompatible with Wickens et al.’s assump-
tion that when the first probe is presented, the list items
or a pointer to the list is brought back into consciousness.
The above conclusion is based upon the premise that
the second probe is functionally an immediate test. One
possible way of maintaining the viability of the Wickens
et al. model is to deny the premise on which we have
based our arguments. If the assumption is made that a sec-
ond retrieval takes place between the first and second
probes, the data are perfectly consistent with the Wickens
et al. model. We do not think that such an assumption
is warranted, however. It seems highly unlikely that a
small set of items that were in an active state would no
longer be in an active state just because a simple response
had been made to a probe, especially when subjects knew
that they would be probed again on these items in 2 sec
time. Note in particular that Baddeley and Hitch (1974)
have shown that subjects could recall a list of three or
four digits in order after having taken 2 or 3 sec to per-
form a sentence-verification task. A supporter of the sec-
ond retrieval assumption should be prepared to explain
why Baddeley and Hitch’s subjects could maintain three
or four digits in PM while doing a sentence-verification
task, whereas our subjects could not maintain two words
during the 1 sec it took them to respond to the probe.
If the second retrieval assumption is rejected, our data
set can be added to a number of data sets that make it
increasingly difficult to maintain the retrieval-plus-scan
model for delayed probe recognition proposed by Wickens
et al., or, for that matter, to maintain the scan model for
immediate probe recognition proposed by Sternberg
(1969). For example, both Monsell (1978) and Baddeley
and Ecob (1973) have provided data that are more con-
sistent with a direct access model for memory retrieval
than they are with the serial scan proposed by Sternberg
and adopted by Wickens et al. Monsell used the varied-
set version of the Sternberg paradigm, varying it only in
presentation rate (two items per second) and retention in-
terval (the probe was presented immediately after the last
item rather than after a 2-sec unfilled retention interval).
The intent of these modifications was to control the sub-
jects’ rehearsal strategies. Monsell was interested in the
serial-position effects of the positive probes as well as the
effects of different types of negative probes. Discussion
of the negative-probe results will be taken up later. For
the positive probes, Monsell found that latency was a func-
tion of how recently the probe item had been studied.
Moreover, he found that the serial-position curves could
be superimposed. The latency for the last item was the
same irrespective of set size, as was the latency for the
second from the last item, the third from last, and so forth.
This superimposition was only qualified by the faster RT
to the first item in any list. He concluded that RT to posi-
tive probes could be described as a function only of
recency (trace strength), minus a constant if the probe hap-
pened to come from the first serial position.
Baddeley and Ecob (1973) also employed the varied-
set version of the Sternberg paradigm. Their modifica-
tion of the task involved repeating items in the memory
set. Thus, in the repeated-items condition of their study,
subjects studied lists in which one or more items were
repeated (e.g., 2474). These lists then were probed with
positive or negative probes. They found that RT was faster
to positive probes from lists that contained repeated items
than from lists that contained no repeated items. They ar-
gued that this result was consistent with a trace-strength
hypothesis, but could be consistent with the scanning no-
tion if it was assumed that repeating an item had no func-
tional effect on set size. That is, a list of four items with
one repeated had a functional set size of three, whereas
a list of four items with no repeats had both a nominal
and a functional set size of four. If this were the case,
one would expect a difference in latency for the negative
probes in each case, since the functional set size differed.
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Baddeley and Ecob found no such difference and hence
rejected the scanning hypothesis in favor of a trace-
strength hypothesis.
A further set of findings that seems hard to explain in
terms of the retrieval-plus-scan model is the effect on RT
when words from prior trials are used as probes on the
current trial. In a number of studies (Halford et al., 1988;
Monsell, 1978), the uniqueness of the probes has been
varied across various trials. Halford et al.’s data are prob-
ably the most appropriate because they based their meth-
odology on the Wickens et al. model. In addition, their
negative-probe data replicate Monsell’s negative-probe
data in all respects. In the Halford et al. experiments, two
types of probes were used on the high-interference trial
of a set of three trials using ending categories. Their
"new" probe was one that had the same ending as the
words in the memory set but had not been seen on either
of the first two trials from that particular category. Their
"old" probe was a word that had been seen previously
on one of the first two prior trials from that particular
category. In each case, the probe could be positive or
negative (i.e., it could have been present or not present
in the current trial). Halford et al. found an interaction
between new and old probes on positive and negative
trials. On the negative trials, the latency for old probes
was reliably slower than that for new probes, and accuracy
was lower on old probes than on new probes. This was
true of all memory-set sizes. However, when the old probe
was a positive probe, subjects were more accurate than
they were for new probes but were faster to respond to
old than to new probes. Unlike the negative trials, how-
ever, this pattern was not maintained for all set sizes
(G. S. Halford, personal communication, 1988). One of
the explanations for these results, suggested by Halford
et al., is that subjects occasionally search previous sets.
This leads to more appropriate responses on positive than
on negative trials. Accepting this explanation preserves
the scanning notion, but it has the ramification that if
subjects are searching previous sets as well as the cur-
rent one, the slopes and intercepts become uninterpret-
able. That is, the values for the slopes and intercepts
will depend on the probability that a previous list is
searched (this could vary with positive and negative
probes) and the time needed to search the previous list
(this will vary with the length of the previous lists). The
importance of this observation is that it destroys the en-
tire evidentiary base for assuming a serial scan in the
first place.
In our opinion, the second-probe data from the current
set of experiments show that the evidence implicating a
retrieval operation for the entire list is extremely weak.
Without such a retrieval operation, the idea that on delayed
probe-recognition tests memory access is gained via the
kinds of scanning operation envisaged by Wickens et al.
(1981) must be discarded. Instead, it appears that memory
access must start with the probe item itself and that the
same memory-access operation must occur on the first
and second probes. Furthermore, these results join with
those of Baddeley and Ecob (1973), Monsell (1978), and
Halford et al. (1988) in casting doubt on memory scanning
as an explanation for the immediate-test results. The prob-
lem here is that the same set-size effects are being obtained
on an immediate test, when items are plausibly available
to be scanned, and on a delayed test in which, without
the postulated retrieval operation, the items are clearly
unavailable for scanning. It thus appears that a memory-
access operation that starts at the presentation of the probe
is required for both immediate and delayed tests.
The postulation of a memory-access operation that starts
with the probe provides a convenient explanation as to
why nothing happened during the 2-sec unfilled interval
between the end of counting and the presentation of the
probe on the delayed tests. This is a problem for the
retrieval-plus-scan model (see the discussion in Wickens
et al., 1981) because it seems plausible that subjects would
use this unfilled interval to retrieve the list so that it would
be in consciousness when the probe was presented. The
problem with adopting the assumption that memory access
starts with the probe and discarding the retrieval-plus-scan
model is that doing so also entails discarding a very con-
venient explanation of why the effects of PI are so simi-
lar for probe recognition and recall (Wickens et al., 1981).
A possible solution to this problem comes from the global
matching models reviewed by Humphreys, Pike, Bain,
and Tehan (1989).
These models differentiate between a matching opera-
tion used for recognition and a retrieval operation used
in recall. In the matching operation, the matches between
the probe and all of the list or experimental memories are
combined into a single value. Thus, these models can ac-
count for the kind of repetition effects found by Baddeley
and Ecob (1973), Halford et al. (1988), and Monsell
(1978). Furthermore, the matching operation can involve
only a single cue or a pair of cues. In all of these models,
when a pair of cues (e.g., AB) is matched against memory,
the result is similar to retrieval using A as a cue. Our
proposal, then, is that probe recognition is a matching
operation and that pair matching is applied to categorized
lists. That is, with categorized lists, it is assumed that a
composite cue consisting of the category label of the last
list and the probe item is matched against memory. At
this time, these models do not predict latencies, and they
do not incorporate the kinds of assumptions needed for
the recency effects found in these pardigms. Thus, it is
not possible to use them to make precise predictions about
probe-recognition paradigms nor is it possible to use them
to explain why PI effects disappear at the shortest of reten-
tion intervals. Nevertheless, the distinction between
matching and retrieval is sufficiently well defined in these
models to be testable. Furthermore, the proposal that
probe recognition with categorized lists is a form of pair
recognition and is thus similar to cued recall has the poten-
tiai to explain both the similarities and the differences be-
tween recognition and recall results.
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